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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 










REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-5-406 
(1953), AS AMENDED, WHEN READ IN CON-
NECTION WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC-
TION 76-7-102 (1953), AS AMENDED, 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT THE AGE AT 
WHICH A PERSON IS DEEMED LEGALLY CAPABLE 
OF CONSENTING TO AN ACT OF SEXUAL INTER-
COURSE, AND THEREFORE INCEST, IS FOURTEEN 
YEARS OF AGE, FOR BOTH MALES AND FEMALES. 
A. THE RESPONDENT SIDESTEPS THE 
CURRENT LAW IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH BY SUGGESTING TO THIS 
COURT THAT A REPEALED STATUTE 
RESOLVES THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
IN THE INSTAHT CASE AS TO THE 
AGE OF CONSENT. 
The respondent submits in its brief that a 
repealed statute is controlling in the instant case. Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 76-53-19 (1953), repealed, and a few 
cases decided thereunder are cited by the respondent as 
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authority for the proposition that a female must be eighteen 
years of age before she is deemed legally capable of consenting 
to an act of illicit sexual intercourse. In citing this re-
pealed statute, the respondent sidesteps the current law and, 
specifically, Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-406 (1953), as amended, 
which states in relevant part as follows: 
An act of sexual intercourse 
. . . is without consent of the 
victim under any of the follow-
ing circumstances: 
(7) The victim is under 
fourteen years of age. 
(Emphasis added.) 
There can be no doubt as to the meaning of § 76-5-406 
and its overruling effect on § 76-53-19: a person, whether 
male or female, over the age of fourteen years, is deemed 
legally capable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. 
The age of fourteen years, set forth as the age of 
consent in the above statute, reflects the considered opinion 
of the Legislature and is consistent with the statutory deter-
mination that the age of fourteen years is the age of criminal 
responsibility, as set out in Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-301 
(1953), as amended. 
In the instant case, the criminal offense of incest 
has been charged against the appellant. Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-7-102 (1953), as amended, sets forth the crime of incest 
as follows: 
-2-
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A person is guilty of incest when 
he has sexual intercourse with a 
person whom he knows to be an 
ancestor, descendant, brother, 
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, 
niece or first cousin. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Since consent is not a defense to the crime of in-
cest, no language as to the age of consent appears in the 
incest statute. Nevertheless, the issue of consent can be, as 
it is in the instant case, important as an evidentiary matter. 
The actus reus of incest, as set forth in the above 
statute, is the act of sexual intercourse. As stated earlier, 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-406(7) expressly provides that a 
person is deemed legally capable of consenting to an act of 
sexual intercourse when he or she reaches the age of fourteen 
years. 
In the instant case, the complaining witness was 
sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense of 
incest and, therefore, legally capable of consenting to the 
actus reus of the crime, sexual intercourse. The complaining 
witness' testimony indicates that she did in fact consent to 
the act of sexual intercourse :and, in so doing, aided in the 
corrnnission of the crime of incest. 
As stated in appellant's original brief, the com-
plaining witness' act of consenting makes her an accomplice 
to the commission of the crime. As a result of being an 
-3-
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accomplice to the crime of incest, whether or not formal 
charges are brought against her, the complaining witness' 
testimony must be corroborated in order to sustain a convic-
tion of the appellant. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION 
OF THE LAW AS TO THE AGE OF CON-
SENT, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY LIMITS 
THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-5-406(7) 
(1953), AS AMENDED, TO MALES 
OVER THE AGE OF FOURTEEN AND 
FEMALES OVER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN, 
IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SEC-
TIONS 2 AND 24 OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
The issue as to whether discrimination between sexes 
based on age is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment has most recently been decided 
in the state of Utah in the case of Stanton v. Stanton, 517 
P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974). In that case, supplementary proceed-
ings were brought by the divorced wife to recover child support 
payments accruing after the daughter reached eighteen years of 
age. The defendant argued that under the divorce decree he 
was only required to make support payments to his daughter 
until she reached the age of majority and that under Utah Code 
Annotated§ 15-2-1 (1953), a female reaches the age of major-
ity at the age of eighteen. The plaintiff contended that the 
-4-
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statute, extending the period of minority in males to the age 
of twenty-one years and in females to only eighteen years, 
denied equal protection of the laws. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that said statute was 
constitutional and stated: 
There is no doubt that the 
questioned statute treats men 
and women differently, but 
people may be treated differ-
ently so long as there is a 
reasonable basis for the 
classification, which is re-
lated to the purposes of the 
act, and it applies equally 
and uniformly to all persons 
within the class. 517 P.2d 
at 1012 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 43 L. Ed. 2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 
1373, rejected the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning and held 
that there was no reasonable basis for the discriminatory 
classification. The United States Supreme Court reversed the 
decision and held that the Utah statute was a denial of equal 
protection under the law. The United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
. . . there is nothing rational 
in the statutory distinction 
between males and females, which 
when related to the divorce 
decree, results in appellee's 
liability for support for the 
daughter only to age 18, but for 
-5-
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the son to age 21, thus imposing 
'criteria wholl! unrelated to 
the objective o that statute.' 
421 U.S. 7, 43 L. Ed. at 691, 
95 S. Ct. 1373 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court relied heavily on 
its earlier decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed.U 
225, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971). That case presented an equal pro-
tection challenge to a provision of the Idaho Probate Code 
which gave preference to males over females when persons, 
otherwise of the same entitlement, applied for appointment as 
administrator of a decedent's estate. The Court held that 
this provision of the probate code violated the equal protec-
tion clause. 
A classification must be reason-
able, not arbitrar~, and must 
rest on some groun of difference 
having a fair and substantial re-
lation to the object of the legis-
lation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike. (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar, counsel for the appellant made 
a motion to dismiss the complaint based on insufficient evi-
dence. Counsel argued that the complaining witness consented 
to the alleged sexual offense and was therefore an accomplice 
to the act so that her testimony would have to be corroborated 
in order to sustain a conviction. The trial court denied 
said motion and stated, "Eighteen and over is an accomplice, 
-6-
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by the statute." (Tr. 19, 20.) 
It is unclear to which statute the trial judge was 
referring. Appellant has been unable to uncover a statute, 
under the modern laws of the State of Utah, which supports 
this conclusion. Since Utah Code Annotated§ 76-5-406 (1953), 
as amended, is the only statute speaking to the age of con-
sent for offenses involving the act of illicit sexual inter-
course, it must be concluded that the trial court was inter-
preting said statute. The trial court's interpretation of 
§ 76-5-406 must meet the test established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Reed, supra, and reiterated in Stanton, 
supra: Discrimination between sexes based on age "must not 
be arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation." 404 U.S. at 75-76. 
It is the appellant's contention that to hold that 
a female must be eighteen years of age before she is legally 
capable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse, where 
a male of only fourteen years is legally capable of consenting 
to the same act and could be charged as an accomplice, is an 
arbitrary classification in violation of Reed, supra, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Distinguishing criminal culpability as between 
sexes based on age has been declared unconstitutional in 
numerous jurisdictions. In Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th 
-7-
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Cir. 1972), Danny Lamb, then 17 years of age, was tried as an 
adult under 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1101 for the crime of burg-
lary of an automobile, a felony under Oklahoma law. Lamb 
argued that he should have been proceeded against as a juve-
nile in juvenile court. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit held: 
Oklahoma statute allowing females 
under the age of 18 the benefits 
of juvenile court proceedings 
while limiting the same benefits 
to males under the age of 16 vio-
lated the equal protection clause. 
456 F.2d at 18. 
The court further stated: 
The general doctrine is that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in respect 
to the administration of criminal 
justice, requires that no differ-
ent degree or higher punishment 
shall be imposed on one than is 
imposed on all for like offenses 
. . . . 456 F.2d at 20 (emphasis 
added). 
This decision was upheld in Radcliff v. Anderson, 
509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974) and was applied retroactively. 
This same issue was brought before the court in 
Ex Parte Mathews, 438 S. W. 2d 438 (1973). The court declared 
that a statute providing for inclusion of females at age 17 
within a definition of the word "child," while not including 
males of the same age, and providing for original jurisdiction 
-8-
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of juvenile court over offenses committed by males under 17 
years of age and females under 18 years of age was unconstitu-
tional. The court stated: 
. . . we are unable to find any 
rational objective or logical 
constitutional justification for 
the disparity in the age classi-
fication between seventeen-
eighteen year old males and 
seventeen-eighteen year old fe-
males. 488 S.W.2d at 438 (em-
phasis added). 
The court in People v. Ellis, 293 N.E. 2d 189 (1973) 
reached the same conclusion holding that: 
The statutory provision here 
under review is clearly a denial 
of equal protection based upon 
a classification by the state 
on account of sex and the same 
is invalid and unconstitutional. 
293 N.E.2d at 193. 
The court reasoned that to deny a male minor the 
protection of juvenile court proceedings and grant such pro-
tection to a female defendant similarly situated amounted to 
a denial of equal protection. 
It has been clearly established that there is no 
rational basis for distinguishing criminal culpability between 
sexes based on age. Therefore, there is no reasonable justi-
fication to support the trial court's conclusion that a 16 
year old female, as a matter of law, cannot be held as an 
-9-
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accomplice to a sex crime, when under Utah law a male of the 
same age could be held criminally culpable. Such a classifi-
cation, based on gender, is therefore "arbitrary" and invalid. 
This arbitrary classification would allow the male 
to be criminally convicted and punished while keeping a female 
similarly situated i=une from any criminal proceedings. As 
established in Lamb, supra, "no different degree or higher 
punishment shall be imposed on one than is imposed on all for 
like offenses . " Since in the present case, the trial 
court held that the complaining witness could not be criminal::: 
prosecuted, but under Utah law a male similarly circumstanced 
could have been criminally punished, this would clearly be a 
denial of equal protection under the laws, as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The law as to the age of consent is clear. Under 
Section 76-2-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953), a person is 
criminally culpable for his conduct at the age of 14 years. 
Section 76-5-406, Utah Cod~ Annotated (1953) provides that a 
person over 14 years of age is deemed capable of consenting 
to the act of sexual intercourse. Under Section 76-7-102, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), sexual intercourse is the actus 
reus for the act of incest. 
In the instant case, the complaining witness was 
-10-
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well over the age of criminal culpability. She admittedly 
consented to the act. She was therefore an accomplice to 
the alleged crime so that her testimony would have to be 
corroborated to sustain a conviction. In the absence of 
corroborating evidence, it was error for the trial court to 
deny counsel's motion to dismiss the complaint based on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence. 
The trial court's interpretation of the Utah law 
as to consent denies equal protection under the law. The 
trial judge's conclusion would protect a female 16 years of 
age who knowingly and voluntarily consented to the act of 
sexual intercourse from being prosecuted as an accomplice. 
However, a male of the same age, similarly situated, could 
be criminally prosecuted and punished as an accomplice. 
There is no doubt that such an application of the law is a 
violation of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Wherefore, the appellant respectfully prays that 
his conviction be reversed or, in the alternative, that this 
court reverse and remand this case for a new trial with an 
instruction to the trial court that the jury must be in-
structed on the applicable law with regard to the age of 
-11-
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consent and accomplices and the need for corroboration in 
order to sustain the conviction of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H.AJ.\TSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
B~~·, \\ y - ) ~.- \ \ 
PJ::L:HariS en ' 
iJ.U& 'M, I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant were delivered to counsel for 
respondent, Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, and Earl F. 
Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
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